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The general orientation of the European Union can be reshaped by a 
committee of wise men. At least that is what Nicolas Sarkozy thinks 
should happen. If such a committee of wise men is to be a success, it will 
be of the utmost importance to prevent it from being instrumentalized in 
the political arena. Furthermore, what in fact is needed is a true European 
debate and not merely the development of specific strategies behind 
closed doors. 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy has once 
again caused a stir among European poli-
cymakers. On 27 August 2007, in his 
keynote speech on foreign policy, he sug-
gested the appointment of a committee of 
wise men whose task would be to think 
about the future of the European Union. 
Sarkozy believes that the committee, 
which will consist of ten or twelve highly 
respected personalities, should present a 
plan for the development of the EU until 
the year 2030 in time for the European 
elections in 2009. It would refer to both 
geographical issues and matters of con-
tent. If the committee was to be instituted, 
Sarkozy would be prepared to give up his 
opposition to the EU’s ongoing accession 
negotiations with Turkey. 
 
I 
What is the point about a 
committee of wise men? 
Sarkozy’s proposals and his implicit criti-
cism that there is no debate about the fu-
ture have touched a raw nerve in the 
European Union. Although originally initi-
ated by the Commission with “Plan D”, the 
debate has simply not taken place. It is 
true, of course, that the conflicts associ-
ated with the European Constitution meant 
that the subject of political power in 
Europe caused some commotion. However, 
in the final analysis a discussion of how 
Europe should look like in the future po-
litically failed to materialize. The question  
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to which extent Europe should be deep-
ened and widened still is not answered. A 
committee of wise men could take this as 
its starting point and then proceed to de-
fine the path the EU ought to pursue. 
 
A s  i s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  b y  a  recent Bertels-
mannn Foundation survey which was con-
ducted between 18 and 22 September 
2007, the majority of the electorates in 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom 
is in favour of appointing a committee of 
wise men. 65 per cent of German inter-
viewees and 67 per cent of French inter-
viewees support Sarkozy’s proposals. In 
the case of the British interviewees, those 
in favour (47 per cent) also have a slight 
lead. The results of the survey are also of 
interest with regard to the responses given 
by different generations. In Germany and 
the United Kingdom 74 and 61 per cent 
respectively of interviewees under 29 are 
in favour of a committee of wise men, 
whereas in France interviewees over 60 
(71 per cent) support the idea. 
 
On the other hand, the political response 
to the proposals has been mixed. At the 
Franco-German summit in Meseberg on 10 
September 2007, German Chancellor An-
gela Merkel indicated that she was basi-
cally in favour of a committee of wise men. 
At the same time she made it quite clear 
that, whilst questions relating to enlarge-
ment were certainly going to be discussed, 
they would not only be about Turkey. 
 
The President of the EU Commission, José 
Manuel Barroso, has also welcomed the 
idea, though he emphasized that it would 
be wrong to undermine legally binding 
agreements pertaining to accession nego-
tiations. Neverthe-
less, it was impera-
tive to continue to 
think about the EU’s 
political mission and 
identity. 
 
Finally, representa-
tives of the European 
Parliament have 
lashed out at the 
proposals, which they 
consider to be a kind 
of relapse into meth-
ods employed in the 
1960s and 1970s. 
They believe that, in-
stead of appointing a 
committee of wise 
men, the EU ought to 
have a new conven-
tion with broadly-based parliamentary and 
civil society participation. Far-reaching 
decisions concerning the future of the 
European Union, the critics believe, should 
not be reached behind closed doors. It is 
also noticeable that neither the current 
Portuguese Presidency nor many of the 
member states have commented on the 
French proposals. Many would simply like 
to ignore them altogether. 
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II 
Important Precursors 
In recent European history there have 
been several examples of committees of 
wise men or reflection groups which were 
instituted in order to create renewed mo-
mentum at critical turning points. Thus in 
1956 the Spaak report paved the way for 
the Treaties of 
Rome. In 1975 
the then Belgian 
prime minister, 
Leo Tindemans, 
adopted a new 
methodology, 
compiling his re-
port on the future 
of the Commu-
nity after inter-
viewing politi-
cians, academics 
and interest 
groups. There 
was another 
spate of reports 
in the 1980s. 
1984 saw the 
publication of 
Spinelli’s draft 
for a European 
constitution. The 
Adonnino report 
(1985), which 
was supposed to 
strengthen Euro-
pean identity, 
was followed by 
the Padoa-
Schioppa report 
(1987), which 
was devoted to economic policy. Finally, 
there was the Delors report (1989) on eco-
nomic and monetary union. 
 
Recently, in 1999, there was a noteworthy 
report on the ramifications of EU enlarge-
ment by a committee of wise men which 
included Jean-Luc Dehaene, Richard von 
Weizsäcker and Lord Simon of Highbury. 
Furthermore, two reports which were ex-
plicitly devoted to the EU’s Lisbon strategy 
had political consequences. The Sapir Re-
port (2003), which was compiled at the 
behest of the Commission, and the Kok 
Report (2004), which was commissioned 
by the European Council, led to a revision 
of the Lisbon strategy. 
 
Not all of the reports published by these 
high-level strategic councils produced im-
mediate results. However, most of them 
made a profound impression in the long 
term and had a lasting influence to Euro-
pean integration. Thus, although it proved 
impossible to implement the Fouchet plans 
in 1961/62, they formed the starting point 
for the Franco-German treaty of friendship. 
The Werner plan, which as early as 1970 
suggested the establishment of a monetary 
union within ten years on the basis of a 
three-stage plan, initially went unheeded. 
However, the Treaty of Maastricht subse- 
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quently laid the foundations for the Euro-
pean economic and monetary union. 
 
In the past, three positive factors have 
governed the fate of specialist groups and 
councils of experts: 
 
•  The probability of success or at least the 
political leverage of committees of wise-
men increased if there was a likelihood 
that the target was treaty reform or at 
least a reform of the fundamental EU 
guidelines governing matters of content. 
Furthermore, the proposals had to be cou-
rageous and innovative. Even if the 
Werner plan for a monetary union was not 
immediately implemented, it resurfaced 
years later, as did Spinelli’s proposal for a 
European constitution. 
 
•  Groups of specialists or experts should 
not be appointed along political lines, and 
thus it would be advisable to eschew par-
ity, proportional representation and politi-
cal parties. A group consisting entirely of 
diplomats and elected politicians, as, for 
example, was the case with the Westen-
dorp reflection group in 1985, will proba-
bly not come up with proposals which 
might be relevant for a debate among the 
general public. 
“No proportional  
representation and no  
political parties” 
•  The final report of a group of experts 
had to go far beyond an analysis and de-
scription of the current political situation. 
Here it would be true to say that less is 
sometimes more. The general public 
should to be included in the process in or-
der to encourage policymakers to think 
about the proposals advanced by the com-
mittee of wise men. For this reason there 
is a need for something which can also be 
communicated in an easily understandable 
and concise form. Examples of this are 
Werner’s three-stage plan or subsequently 
the Delors report. 
 
 
III 
Conditions for success  
today 
Additionally to the experience of previous 
committees, five challenges currently fac-
ing European policymakers should be 
taken into account if the committee of 
wise men wishes to be a success. 
 
•  First, the heads of state and government 
should ensure that Nicolas Sarkozy cannot 
instrumentalize the committee of wise 
men in order to achieve his political goals. 
If the European Union wishes to retain its 
credibility, the question of the geographi-
cal boundaries of the EU and in particular 
the subject of Turkey must not be allowed 
to dominate the work of the new commit-
tee. At the start of the accession talks with 
Turkey in December 2005 the EU commit-
ted itself to an impartial process guided by 
the Commission. The outcome of the nego-
tiations should decide whether or not Tur-
key can join the EU, and nothing else. If 
the committee of wise men were to assume 
responsibility for the decision on whether 
or not to admit Turkey, the authority of the 
Commission as principal negotiator would 
suffer immeasurably. 
 
•  Second, the committee of wise men 
should concentrate on providing political 
orientation, even though it would be pos-
sible to exert far more political pressure 
with proposals designed to implement in-
stitutional reforms. In the past 15 years 
the legal basis of the European Union was 
fundamentally reshaped on three occa-
sions by the treaties of Maastricht, Am-
sterdam and Nice. The entry into force of 
the Reform Treaty would constitute yet 
another profound change in the institu-
tional architecture of the European Union. 
However, new debates about institutional 
reform shortly after the (possible) adop-
tion of the Reform Treaty might weaken 
the acceptance of the European Union 
even further, since the necessity of   
  
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
A
 
C
h
a
n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
W
i
s
e
 
M
e
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p
a
g
e
 
5
 
#
 
2
0
0
7
/
0
7
 
additional changes after such a long period 
of reform would be difficult to justify. 
 
•  Third, against the background of the on-
going criticism of the EU on account of its 
democratic deficits, it would be wrong to 
evade the question of the democratic le-
gitimacy of the committee of wise men. 
The central innovations of the 
Constitutional Treaty drawn up by the 
European Convention - which are likely to 
be adopted in the Reform Treaty -  particu-
larly aimed to strengthen the democratic 
life of the European Union. Therefore, 
when the committee of wise men receives 
its mandate, this should on no account ne-
gate the principle of participation. There 
must be sufficient opportunities for public 
debate. 
“Why not a non-European 
in the committee  
of wise men?” 
•  Fourth, the committee of wise men 
should not be dominated by active politi-
cians. Angela Merkel has already come out 
in favour of appointing personalities “who 
possess a certain aloofness, a kind of far-
sighted vision.” It is conceivable that they 
might be prominent people in public life 
such as, for example, intellectuals, aca-
demics, artists, businessmen, or sports-
men. However, there is a risk that the 
whole project might lose credibility on ac-
count of the committee’s low-key political 
profile.  The basic idea that the committee 
of wise men is a strategic instrument for 
long-term planning would thus be discred-
ited. On the other hand, it would be inter-
esting to include a non-European in the 
committee of wise men. An unfamiliar 
view from the outside might help to put an 
end to the Europeans’ navel gazing. 
 
•  Fifth, the committee of wise men must 
take into account the current reality of 
European politics. With its 27 member 
states the European Union will find it very 
difficult to reconcile the differing inter-
ests, goals and targets, and will have to   
 
make substantial compromises. The sum-
mit of the EU heads of state and govern-
ment in June 2007 gave a glimpse of a 
new style of media-based confrontation 
that derives from an attempt to defend 
vested interests and power. There is now 
little sign of a strategy of sustained com-
promise among the member states which 
could give a new impetus to the develop-
ment of Europe.  
 
IV 
New Food for Thought 
It is not a foregone conclusion that the 
committee of wise men will be a success, 
and it cannot be guaranteed that its work 
will have a sustained effect. However, it 
would be wrong to underestimate the ex-
tent of what it might possibly achieve. 
 
In recent years it has become apparent 
that both the member states and the insti-
tutions of the European Union are either 
partly or wholly unable to initiate a debate 
about a common vision of the EU in 2020 
or 2030, and to reach certain conclusions. 
In the daily business of politics it is clear 
that the interests of what are now 27 
member states diverge considerably. Only 
b y d int o f g re at e ffo r t w as  it p o s s ib le  to  
reach a fragile compromise in the shape of 
the Reform Treaty, which is totally uncer-
tain to enter into force in this form. 
 
When the committee of wise men meets, it 
should aim to provide food for thought and 
specific topics for a broadly-based debate 
among politicians and society throughout 
the length and breadth of Europe. The fol-
lowing issues are particularly important: 
 
•  What are the political and strategic chal-
lenges which the European Union will 
have to meet in the years ahead, both 
within the Union and with regard to its ex-
ternal relations with other states and 
global regions? 
 
•  What will be the political and economic 
significance of the European Union in the  
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global context, and how can it attain or 
preserve this significance? 
 
•  In the light of the diverging ideas and 
predilections of the member states, how 
can further steps towards greater integra-
tion be implemented by states in favour of 
integration? What differentiation strate-
gies can the European Union develop? 
 
•  How can the decision-making structures 
and institutions of the European Union be 
politicized so that they will be of interest 
to EU citizens and gain democratic legiti-
macy? What are the roles of the media, the 
political parties, and other civil society ac-
tors? 
“Initiate the long-overdue 
debate” 
A committee of wise men which consists of 
independent members and mirrors the di-
versity of opinion within the Union will be 
in a much better position to deal with such 
questions than a committee of elected poli-
ticians. The restriction to strategic ques-
tions will make it difficult to get bogged 
down in details and will prevent the kind 
of failure brought about by the intrusion of 
the business of daily politics. In such a 
best-case scenario the committee of wise 
men can initiate the long-overdue debate 
about the ways and means the European 
Union might employ to meet the chal-
lenges with which it will be confronted 
whether it likes it or not, for example, the 
economic rise of the Asian region, espe-
cially of China and India, the security pol-
icy risks of terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction, the provision of energy sup-
plies at affordable prices, tackling climate 
change and its effects, global migration, 
and population growth. If the committee of 
wise men manages to convince the mem-
ber states of the necessity for joint Euro-
pean action in strategically important ar-
eas, then much will have been achieved. 
 
 
 
 
V 
Strengthening the  
European public debate 
As past events have demonstrated, coun-
cils of experts and specialist commissions 
have often been in a position to provide 
important and far-reaching ideas for the 
subsequent development of the European 
Union. A committee of wise men would 
find it possible to do things which are 
simply out of the question in the narrower 
political decision-making sphere. For this 
reason much speaks in favour of establish-
ing such a committee.  
 
On the other hand, this council is being 
convened in “turbulent” times in which 
the Reform Treaty is being ratified in the 
member states and preparations are under 
way for a new European Parliament and a 
new Commission. In this context a com-
mittee of wise men could easily be allowed 
to recede into the background. Further-
more, it would to some extent run counter 
to the fundamentally new idea of greater 
participation by both civil society and the 
democratically elected members of the 
European Parliament and the national par-
liaments in the decision-making processes 
that pertain to the future of the EU. 
 
However, if this committee of wise men is 
convened, it should be given a chance to 
show what it can do. For this to happen 
certain preconditions must be complied 
with. In order to work in an effective and 
efficient manner, the committee needs a 
clear mandate. Moreover, the member 
states and EU institutions must be willing 
to take note of its recommendations. Yet 
what the committee has to say will only 
become widely known if its work initiates 
a broadly-based public debate about the 
ways and means of European integration. 
The election campaign for the European 
polls in 2009 could constitute the platform 
for a debate about the future of Europe 
that takes its bearings from the report of 
the committee of wise men.  
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